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Abstract: Previous analyses of fat taxes have generally worked within an empirical framework
in which it is difficult to determine whether consumer welfare increases from the policy. This
note outlines a simple means to determine whether consumers benefit from a fat tax by
comparing the ratio of expenditures on the taxed good to the weight effect of the tax against the
individual’s willingness-to-pay to for a one-pound weight reduction. Our empirical calculations
suggest that consumers would be have to be willing to pay $6,000 to $7,500 to reduce weight by
one pound for a soda tax to be welfare enhancing. The results either suggest that a soda tax is
very unlikely to increase consumer welfare or that the policy must be justified on some other
grounds that abandon standard rationality assumptions.

Introduction
Given the rapid rise in obesity, academics and policy makers have proposed a variety of options
to improve public health. One of the most studied mechanisms is the fat tax, which uses the
state’s taxing power to alter relative prices in an attempt to encourage healthier eating.
Economists have been at the forefront of determining the effects of fat taxes, in large part
because of the need to estimate demand elasticities to project consumption and weight changes.
Examples of studies that have used demand estimates to simulate weight or health effects of fat
taxes include Allais, Bertail, and Nichèle (2009), Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro (2003), Cash,
Sunding, and Zilberman (2005), Kuchler, Tegene, and Harris, (2005), and Chouinard et al.
(2007), among others (see Cash and Lacanilao, 2007 or Etilé, 2011 for reviews).
Although such studies have provided important insights into the potential effects of fat
taxes, there is a fundamental inconsistency inherent in the studies. In particular, these studies
typically estimate price elasticities, in which estimated demand curves are assumed to arise from
constrained utility maximization given prices and budget constraints. The conceptual
inconsistency arises from the fact that higher prices (from fat taxes) can only lower welfare
within the analyzed framework; the estimated demand curves arise from a system in which utility
and thus demand is unaffected by health or weight. Presumably, however, fat taxes are studied
because of some underlying belief that it is at least theoretically possible to improve consumer
welfare by raising the prices of certain foods. Although many of the aforementioned studies
allude to the potential existence of externalities associated with public health care costs, such
potential benefits are outside the modeling framework used to estimate food demand. In short,
previous economic work on fat faxes has lacked transparency in formally identifying when fat
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taxes increase consumer welfare, despite the fact that such motivations obviously underlie the
policy question addressed.
The purpose of this note is to provide a simple framework to determine whether a fat tax
improves consumer welfare. We adopt the framework introduced by Philipson and Posner
(1999) and further developed by Schroeter, Lusk and Tyner (2008), who include weight as an
argument of the utility function. We show the conditions under which a fat tax can increase
consumer welfare within this framework, and provide some empirical calculations on whether a
soda tax increases welfare. 1

Model
Following Schroeter, Lusk, and Tyner (2008), we use a simple two-good model, in which
consumers derive utility from consuming a high-calorie food, FH, and a low-calorie food, FL, in
addition to their weight, W, which is a function of the quantity of foods consumed and exercise,
E: W = W(FH, FL, E). Weight is increasing in food intake, ∂W/∂F > 0 and decreasing in exercise,
∂W/∂E < 0. The consumers’ utility function is U(W(FH, FL, E), FH, FL, E), which is increasing at
a decreasing rate in FH and FL. Utility is assumed to be increasing in W at levels below an
individual’s subjective, ideal weight, WI, and is decreasing thereafter. Given that the majority of
people in the US are overweight, it is likely that ∂U/∂W < 0 for most individuals.
Consumers choose levels of food intake and exercise to maximize utility. Given prices of
high- and low-calorie food, and exercise, PH, PL, and PE, and income, I, maximization leads to
Marshallian demands for food and exercise, FH*(PH, PL, PE, I), FL*(PH, PL, PE, I), E*(PH, PL, PE,
1

Of course, there are other frameworks which could be used to describe how consumers might benefit from a fat
tax, such as using behavioral economics or developing a model with externalities. While we are agnostic about the
role for the federal government in regulating weight, our objective here is to provide a simple framework that is at
least internally consistent in so far as being able to analyze the effects of a fat tax where consumers can be shown to
potentially benefit from the policy. We touch on some of these other modeling alternatives in the conclusions.
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I), which can be substituted into the weight equation to determine economically optimal weight,
W*(PH, PL, PE, I). The economically optimal weight W* may not necessarily coincide with the
ideal weight WI or even weight that is optimal for the health of the individual.
Substituting each of these functions back into objective function yields the indirect utility
function:
(1)

𝑉�𝑃𝐻 , 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼, 𝑊 ∗ (𝑃𝐻 , 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼 )�.

Now, imagine a policy that implements an ad valorem tax of t to the high-calorie food,
increasing the price from PH to PH(1+t). The welfare effects of the tax can be calculated by
determining the consumer’s equivalent variation, EV, or the amount of money that must be added
to income to make the consumer indifferent to the tax hike. The welfare value is determined by
the following equality:
(2)

𝑉�𝑃𝐻 (1 + 𝑡), 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼 + 𝐸𝑉, 𝑊 ∗ (𝑃𝐻 (1 + 𝑡), 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼 + 𝐸𝑉 )� =

𝑉�𝑃𝐻 , 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼, 𝑊 ∗ (𝑃𝐻 , 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑃𝐸 , 𝐼 )�

The left-hand side of the equality in (2) describes the consumer’s utility in the case where the fattax is imposed and where EV has been added to income in order to off-set the disutility of the tax
and the right-hand side represents the consumer’s utility in the status-quo before implementing
the fat tax.
The welfare effects of the policy can be determined by taking a linear approximation
around the inequality in (2) and re-arranging terms:
(3)

𝐸𝑉 = �𝜕𝑉

−𝑃 𝐻𝑡

𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑊∗
+
𝜕𝐼 𝜕𝑊∗ 𝜕𝐼

��

𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑃

𝐻 +

𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗ 𝜕𝑃 𝐻

�.

Equation (3) shows that the welfare effects of a fat tax involve a trade-off between the disutility
consumers receive from higher prices given by

𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑃 𝐻
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and the added utility individuals receive from

decreasing body weight as a result of the tax implementation, which is given by
useful to consider the special case in which

𝜕𝑊 ∗
𝜕𝐼

𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗ 𝜕𝑃 𝐻

. It is

= 0, which is likely to hold for small marginal

changes in income. In this case, equation (3) can be re-written as:
(4)

𝐸𝑉 = 𝑃𝐻 𝑡 �

𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑃𝐻
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐼

−

−

𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑊∗
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐼

𝜕𝑊 ∗
𝜕𝑃 𝐻

�.

Equation (4) can be further simplified by noting that the first term in parentheses,

𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑃𝐻
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐼

−

, is equal

to FH* due to Roy’s identity, where the * superscript indicates utility maximizing levels. The
second term in parentheses,

𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑊∗
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐼

, is the marginal utility of weight gain divided by the marginal

utility of income, which is equal to the individual’s willingness-to-pay to reduce weight by one
∗

pound, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊 , multiplied by negative one. Thus, equation (4) can be re-written as:
(5)

∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝐸𝑉 = 𝑃𝐻 𝑡 �𝐹 𝐻∗ + 𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑊 � 𝜕𝑃𝐻 ��.

Equation (5) shows that the welfare effects of a fat tax, as indicated by the level of
compensation that must be given to an individual to offset the increased price, EV, is increasing
in the size of the tax, t, and the consumption level of the taxed good, FH*. However, EV is falling
∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗

in 𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑊 because 𝐻 < 0. This means that with this simple framework, in which weight is
𝜕𝑃
included as an argument in the utility function, it is possible to see how consumers could be
∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗

made better off from the tax: a condition which occurs if EV < 0 or if 𝐹 𝐻∗ < −𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑊 � 𝜕𝑃𝐻 �.
The higher the value an individual places on losing weight, the more likely is the condition to
hold.
In a traditional economic model, weight is excluded as an argument of the utility
function, which means equation (5) reduces to 𝑃𝐻 𝐹 𝐻∗ 𝑡, which is simply the change in
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expenditure on the high-calorie good resulting from the tax: a value which can only be positive.
That is, in the traditional economic framework EV can only be positive, meaning consumers are
worse off from the tax (they must compensated a positive amount to offset the disutility of the
tax). Equation (5) generalizes this result to allow the benefits of weight loss to be balanced
against the costs of the tax.

Empirical Considerations
The question arises as to how one could empirically determine whether the welfare effects of a
fat tax are beneficial to consumers. As indicated, this condition occurs if
∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝐹 𝐻∗ < −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊 � 𝐻 �. The first term, FH*, is easily observed as it is an individual’s level of
𝜕𝑃

consumption of the high-calorie good. The weight reductions occurring from the price change,

𝜕𝑊 ∗
𝜕𝑃 𝐻

, might initially appear difficult to determine; however, Schroeter, Lusk, and Tyner (2008)

show that the value can straightforwardly calculated using own- and cross-price elasticities of
demand along with weight-consumption elasticities, which can be determined using energy
𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝑊∗

accounting. In particular, their results imply that 𝜕𝑃𝐻 = (𝜀 𝐻𝐻 𝜂𝐻 + 𝜀 𝐿𝐻 𝜂𝐿 + 𝜀 𝐸𝐻 𝜂𝐸 ) � 𝑃𝐻 �, where

𝜀 𝐻𝐻 is the own-price elasticity of demand for the high-calorie food, 𝜀 𝐿𝐻 and 𝜀 𝐸𝐻 are cross-price

elasticities of demand for low calorie food and exercise with respect to the price of high-calorie
food, and where 𝜂𝑘 is the percentage change in weight resulting from a 1% increase in

consumption of good k = H, L, and E, high-calorie food, low-calorie food, and exercise,
respectively.
The term that is most uncertain in equation (5), in the sense that there are not wellestablished values in the literature, is an individual’s willingness-to-pay for a one pound weight
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∗

reduction, 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊 . As such, it might be useful to use existing values of 𝐹 𝐻∗ and calculated
values of

𝜕𝑊 ∗
𝜕𝑃 𝐻

∗

to infer the value of 𝑊𝑇𝑃 𝑊 that would be required for an individual to benefit

from the fat tax. Such a procedure, while not providing a precise answer, can at least provide an
intuitive feel for the likelihood of a fat tax being welfare-enhancing.
Re-writing the welfare-enhancing condition in terms of weight willingness to pay yields:
(6)

and substituting the equation for
(7)

𝜕𝑊 ∗

∗

EV < 0 if 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊 > 𝐹 𝐻∗ / �− 𝜕𝑃𝐻 �,
∗

𝜕𝑊 ∗

𝜕𝑃 𝐻

given above and rearranging yields:

EV < 0 if 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑊 > 𝐹 𝐻∗ 𝑃𝐻 /�𝑊 ∗ (𝜀 𝐻𝐻 𝜂𝐻 + 𝜀 𝐿𝐻 𝜂𝐿 + 𝜀 𝐸𝐻 𝜂𝐸 )� .

The numerator, 𝐹 𝐻∗ 𝑃𝐻 is simply the expenditure on the high-calorie food, and the denominator,

𝑊 ∗ (𝜀 𝐻𝐻 𝜂𝐻 + 𝜀 𝐿𝐻 𝜂𝐿 + 𝜀 𝐸𝐻 𝜂𝐸 ), is the change in weight (in lbs) that results from a 1% increase in
the price of the high-calorie food, 𝑃𝐻 .

Equation (7) provides a convenient means of calculating whether a fat tax is welfare-

enhancing by employing the type of data that is normally used to simulate the weight effects of a
fat tax. For example, consider the results in Schroeter, Lusk, and Tyner (2008) related to a tax
on sugary soft drinks – a target of many fat tax advocates. Their results suggest that a 1%
increase in the price leads to a 0.019 lbs weight loss for men and a 0.02 lbs weight loss for
women. They also report that men and women consume about 14.125 oz and 12.156 oz of
caloric soft drinks per day, and the data in Dhar et al. (2003) indicate that caloric soft drinks cost
about $0.027/oz. This means that men spend about $140.97 on caloric soft drinks each year and
women spend about $121.32/year. Plugging this data into equation (7), we can see that men
would have to be willing-to-pay at least 140.97/0.019 = $7,419.47 per lb of weight lost and
women would have to be willing-to-pay at least 121.32/0.02 = $6,066 per lb of weight lost in
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order for a fat tax to improve their welfare. It is difficult to imagine that most people would be
willing to pay such a large sum of money for a relatively small weight loss. Stated differently,
within the framework analyzed here, it is rather unlikely that a fat tax would be welfareenhancing.

Summary and Conclusions
This note provided a convenient means to determine whether a fat tax is welfare-enhancing. By
including weight as an argument to the utility function, we show that a fat tax can be welfare
enhancing if the amount people are willing to pay for a one-pound weight reduction is greater
than the ratio of the expenditure on the taxed good to the weight loss produced by the tax. Our
empirical calculations show that men (women) would have to be willing pay $7,419 ($6,066) per
pound of body weight lost for a tax on caloric soft drinks to be welfare enhancing. The fact that
consumers are very unlikely to pay such high amount suggest: 1) the soda tax will not improve
welfare within the context of the model used here, or 2) a soda tax policy would have be justified
on some other grounds.
There are other conceptual models which might be used to motivate a fat tax. For
example, many argue that obesity causes an externality. Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wand
(2004), for example, calculate that each obese individual increases the cost of Medicare by
$1,486, the cost of Medicaid by an extra $864, and private insurance by an additional $423
annually. A model arguing that the existence of externalities justifies a fat tax would need to link
the externality costs imposed on individuals to the offsetting benefits from others’ weight
reductions. An alternative modeling approach might rely on behavioral economics to motivate a
fat tax. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999 and 2000) argue that people have self-
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control problems when dealing with intertemporal decisions that involve choices between
immediate benefits (e.g., tasty food) and future costs (e.g., obesity). In such a model, a fat tax
could serve to improve social welfare by moving some of the future costs to the present.
While it is clearly possible to justify a fat tax by pointing to externalities of behavioral
economics, the problem is that it few authors have worked out the steps to actually empirically
determine whether a fat tax is welfare enhancing within these frameworks. As fat taxes move
closer to being actually implemented, it would seem imperative for authors to actually calculate
the welfare consequences of a fat tax rather than making vague reference to a justification based
on externalities or behavioral economics. This note provided one simple framework in which
such a calculation is possible.
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